AFCIA CONFERENCE 2006
AFCIA NATIONAL CONFERENCE AFTER ACTION REPORT

On 03 May 2006, the American Federal Contract Investigators Association (AFCIA) hosted its first
annual National Conference at Fort Myer, Virginia.  In attendance were Members of the AFCIA,
representatives of the Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) Vendors (CACI, Inc.; Kroll Worldwide
Services; OMNIPLEX International, Inc., ManTech/MSM; US Investigations Services, Inc., and SA-Tech,
Inc.), the U.S. General Accounting Office, and the Office of Personnel Management – Federal
Investigative Services Division (OPM-FIS).  

The Conference was opened by Carolyn Martin, AFCIA President.  Carolyn welcomed the attendees
and introduced the current AFCIA Officers, Regional Directors, and Board Members, i.e.,

Mary Cullings - Vice President
Russell Vail, Central Regional Director
Matt Baumgartner, Mid-Atlantic Charter Director
Bonnie Lowe-Walsh, Mid-Atlantic Charter Assistant Director
Steve Cox, Mid-Atlantic Charter Secretary
Tom Dutcher, Board Member

Other AFCIA Members in attendance:
Larry Dulong, Member
Josephine Fontana, Member
Ray Brett, Member and representing ADC, Ltd.

_____________________________________________________

The AFCIA’S Mission Statement, Member Services, and Training Initiatives were provided.  Concerns
presented in the AFICA’S White Paper issues were presented and the AFCIA Members’ concerns as
well as recommendations for the current OPM-FIS contract.  

1.        PERSONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (PSI) vice BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS – POLICY
/ STANDARDS & REGULATIONS

The first issue of the AFCIA White Paper dated 01/06/2006 is “OPM Is Operating Without Signed Policy
Or Regulations.”  The OPM Investigators Handbook DRAFT is written for conducting background
investigations ADDRESSING TRUSTWORTHINESS AND SUITABILITY VICE ACTUAL PERSONNEL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS.  Appendices to the Handbook include:

Executive Order 10450 – Security Requirements for Government Employees
Executive Order 12968 – Access to Classified Information
Counterintelligence Concerns and Awareness
DCID 6/4 (Director Central Intelligence Directive) - Personnel Security Standards and Procedures
Governing Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

Although these directives are cited in the Appendices of the Handbook, the regulations contained within
these regulations are NOT reflected or exercised in the OPM Investigators Handbook DRAFT or in the
OPM- Federal Investigation Services Department (FISD) methodologies of conducting Personnel
Security Investigations (PSI).  Additionally, Executive Order 12829 – The National Industrial Security
Program (NISPOM) is NOT contained within the OPM Investigators Handbook DRAFT or exercised
within the OPM-FISD processes or procedures.  

Conducting PSIs under OPM-FISD regulations, Investigators are hindered and prevented from  
submitting a complete and comprehensive investigation to the Adjudicator.  

2.        CONTRACT INVESTIGATORS

REQUIREMENTS –
        Experience
        Training
        Security Clearance

As reported in the AFCIA White Paper, OPM Contract Investigators do not possess a security
clearance.  Every Agency (NSA, DIA, FBI, US Customs & Border Protection, etc.) who contract their PSIs
mandate that each Investigator meet the following minimum requirements:

        A completed SSBI (Single-Scoped Background Investigation) / SSBI-PR (Periodic Reinvestigation)
        A Top Secret (TS) eligibility or Secret clearance
        Three to five years investigative experience

OPM does not require Contract Investigators to adhere to these minimum requirements.  This practice
is not in keeping with the spirit or the requirements of supporting the National and Homeland Security
effort.  Investigators with two weeks of - training that does not address Personnel Security Investigations
(PSI) - Investigators with little to no investigative experience and no security clearance is a national
travesty waiting to happen.  

3.        FIS AGENTS

        Morale is poor
        Performance standards (goals) do not appear to be attainable
        Management by threat and intimidation appears to prevail

Most of the current Federal Investigation Services (FIS) Agents (government Agents) are former DSS
(Defense Security Services) Agents.  OPM has taken responsibility for the investigative operations for
Department of Defense.  The OPM FIS Agent morale and motivation is very poor due to the
management initiatives implemented under OPM.     

Current FIS investigative personnel report that it is common practice for OPM-FIS to manage FIS
Agents through threats and intimidation via Headquarters and Field Office Managers.  FIS Agents who
have ten to twenty years of federal investigative experience are using their annual leave time to write
reports due to unrealistic, unachievable performance mandates which appear to be in conflict with
performance standards.  FIS Agents are threatened with no promotions and/or withholding of scheduled
step increases based on unrealistic performance standards.  The mandate actually appears to prohibit
the Agents to “investigate” rather than “assess” their casework.    The current performance standards
appear to be unrealistic even under “perfect” non-issue investigative situations.  The performance
requirements do not appear to allow for needed travel time, developed issues, time needed to locate
the Subject and/or Sources or even administrative time necessary for report writing, establishing
appointments, investigative review, etc.  

Current FIS employees state that overall morale of all FIS Agents has reached an all-time low since the
transition of DSS to OPM.  It should be noted that six FIS Agents and 14 government Adjudicators that
initially indicated a positive attendance at the AFCIA National Conference, declined to attend after
notification that OPM-FISD representation would be attending the Conference.  

Allegations continue to accrue that OPM Contract Investigators are being suspended by OPM without
benefit of due process.  OPM alleges that Contract Investigators are falsifying Reports of Investigations
when utilizing standard software tools such as cutting and pasting standard waivers and denials of
information which are in accordance with the OPM regulations.  Some Contract Investigators
experiencing these allegations have 20 years or more of investigative experience without any prior
incidents.   When any OPM Contract Investigator is suspended, all Vendors under the OPM contract are
notified of the suspension and the Investigator can not work for any Vendor on any OPM Contract.  This
method of suspending and terminating Contract Investigators appears to be in violation of the Federal
Acquisition Requirements (FAR - 5CFR 731) and the Internal Revenue Act of 1978.   

4.        THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS

        Complete Investigation (undue delays based on returns of investigations for insignificant, non-
adjudicative items)  
        SPINS resulting from inadequate SSBI/SSBI-PR
        JPAS – “Case Closed / Pending”

Under OPM-FISD regulations, Investigators are hindered if not, prevented from conducting complete
and comprehensive Personnel Security Investigations and reporting the facts to the Adjudicator.  
Examples:  
FIS Agents nor Contract Investigators have the ability to “accurately” report issues or information
discovered during the course of the investigation.  OPM regulations do not allow word usage such as
Christmas, church, pastor, Boy Scouts, Valentines Day, Skin-Heads, Al-Quida, etc. in Reports of
Investigation (ROI).  Reports are being returned three to nine months after initial submission to correct
such verbiage which bears no significance to the adjudicative or security clearance outcome.  
Furthermore, Case Reviewers are sending back cases requesting non-adjudicative information, e.g.,
“What is the definition of a geographical bachelor?” or, “How long has SUBJECT been known as Ed?”  
The repeated return of Reports for items having no adjudicative significance has a tremendous
negative impact on the timeliness for processing  Personnel Security Investigations (PSI) and obviously
serves only to increase the overall cost of every investigation, proving extremely costly to the taxpayer,
the Vendors and the originating Government Agency.  

Contract Investigators are not provided with credit reports for cases where the Subject may or may not
have financial issues.  FIS Agents (government investigators) have the ability to obtain and print the
necessary credit reports – Contract Investigators (who greater populate the PSI industry) do not.   

Conducting suitability and trustworthiness Investigations under the same regulations as Personnel
Security Investigations (PSIs) has caused a huge financial and personnel resources strain on local
communities, nationwide.  Under the OPM requirements, all PSI as well as Public Trust Positions
currently mandate local agency checks.  Prior to the transition of DSS to OPM, the local agencies
conducted about 1.2 million local agency checks as required by Title 5, USC.  

There has been such a surge of local agency check requests that the local law enforcement
communities cannot handle these costs.  This serves to hinder the accuracy and completion of DoD
PSIs and has now resulted in an extreme negative impact on other Agencies, i.e., FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA,
USCBP, etc, to accomplish their investigations.  Law enforcement agencies throughout the U.S. are
force to resort to limited Local Agency Checks and are refusing to conduct Local Agency Checks for
Contract Investigators.  Measures such as these only serve to negatively impact our National and
Homeland security effort.    

OPM mandates that all Investigators re-check military personnel records, medical, security, and police
records although OPM is aware that the Requester (Certifier) has endorsed the Personnel Security
Questionnaire that those records have been previously checked and if any negative information is
identified, the negative information is noted.  Additionally, the military command does not maintain any
security records.  All security information is reported to the Joint Personnel Administration System
(JPAS) and any breaches of security, security violations, clearance suspensions, revocations, and
terminations are maintained in the service member’s personnel records and/or JPAS (Joint Personnel
Administration System).  The OPM requirement to re-review all personnel, security, medical, and police
records are nothing short of redundant, costly to the taxpayer, and reduces the timeliness of
Investigations.   

Due to OPM requirements, FIS/CONTRACT Investigators cannot complete and report a Personnel
Security Investigation (PSI) immediately and decisively.  Developed information is prohibited from
expansion during the initial investigation under the OPM-FIS regulations.  Developed information must
be reported under an issue code, which also requires field adjudication and Investigators ARE NOT
trained in adjudication.  Then, the case is sent to the Requestor identified as “Case Closed – Pending.”  
(This is interpreted to the Adjudicator that the initial investigation has been closed by OPM, however,
has been identified as possessing issue(s) that must be reviewed by the Adjudicator and the
Adjudicator must determine if further action will be requested.  

Generally, the Adjudicator will return the case to OPM, which in turn, then opens the case as a
“different” case to investigate the issue(s) previously discovered on the initial investigation (at an
additional cost).  It is obvious that this practice adversely impacts cost effectiveness and case timeliness.

Special Interviews (SPINS) are the result of cases that should have been completed during the initial
interview/investigation are costly to all tax payers.  It appears the OPM procedures cost up to three
times a much as if the case was “correctly” investigated when the case was initially assigned.

INVESTIGATORS must have the latitude to analyze, assess and decide what actions are required to
complete investigations in accordance with proper Personnel Security Procedures and ensure they are
completed in a timely manner.  

WHEN inexperienced and uncleared Investigators with virtually no experience or minimal training are
placed in the field as an Investigators in support of National and Homeland Security, it appears that
OPM is not committed to protecting our National Security, but that its commitment is to making a profit at
the expense of the taxpayer and our Nation’s security overall.

When OPM reports the backlog that they claim they have alleviated, the question must arise, “How
many of those cases “closed” can actually be “adjudicated… “Case Closed / Pending.”  OPM appears
to be costing us, the American taxpayer, enormous amounts of money.  OPM conveys the impression
that their Agency’s goal is not to protect the National Security of the U.S., but that is must generate
revenue to justify it’s existence at any cost.  


5.        PIPS / PIPS-R (Reporting Systems For Writing, Processing And Submitting Reports Of
Investigation)

        Certified and Accredited (C&A)  - DISA/NISA
        Scope, Assign, Investigate, Adjudicate
        Timeliness / $$$  

There is no indication that the PIPS / PIPS-R Certified & Accredited for security.  

Agents and Investigators report that PIPS and PIPS-R takes an average of four times longer to submit
an ROI on PIPS and PIPS-R than any other information technology system previously or currently used.  
OPM methodologies of operation and PIPS, require the Agent/Investigator to scope, assign, investigate
and adjudicate.  The OPM-FISD reviewing system, returned report policies, reporting format, non-
consistency, and overall methodology appears to fail to meet the standards set by current Executive
Orders, directives and regulations to conduct Personnel Security Investigations (PSIs).  The PIPS and
PIPS-R is antiquated, cumbersome, ineffective, and inefficient, extremely time consuming and does
nothing to benefit the investigative process to meet goals and objectives.

6.        STATISTICS

        November 2005 – alleviated 25% backlog
        Reported 6,000 workers (government and contractors)

In November 2005, OPM reported that 25% of the backlog in background investigations had been
alleviated.  In October 2004, the Contractors who conducted DSS background investigations returned
approximately 350,000 uncompleted PSI cases.

During the period from October 2004 to approximately February 2005, DSS Federal Agents were being
trained to conduct personnel security investigations under the OPM background investigations
requirements.  A minimal amount of the DoD backlogged cases were completed and closed for
adjudication during the DSS/OPM transition period.  The Contractors (Vendors) were awarded the OPM
contract to conduct background investigations and none of the Vendors began training Contract
Investigators until January 2005.  

From January 2005 to April 2005, there were only about 200 Contract Investigators trained to conduct
OPM Investigations (minus the USIS Investigators).  How could 25% of the DOD backlog have been
alleviated when in the interim, newly submitted cases were being investigated as well?  Additionally, how
many of these “alleviated” backlog cases were closed by OPM as  “Case Closed – Pending?”

OPM reported to Congress, “In 2004, OPM awarded contracts to five additional companies, and today,
the six companies under contract have almost 6,000 resources that supplement OPM’s 2,000 Federal
staff dedicated to the investigations program. We are now working to develop the proficiency of the
Contractor’s newer hires, along with transferred DSS staff.  Over the next six months, we will see
significant performance improvement as our staff becomes fully productive and the number of
contractor resources continues to grow.”  

The questions arises, how many of the “6,000 resources” that the six companies have are “full-time”
resources and how many are being counted multiple times?   It is widely known that the majority of OPM
Contract Investigators work for multiple companies. Therefore, it appears patently obvious, one
Investigator does not equate to one full-time, 40 hour weekly investigator.  Also, how many of the “6,000
resources” are Investigators, Reviewers, Managers, etc.?  

Following the presentation of the AFCIA White Paper Points, Ms. Kathy Dillaman, Associate Director,
OPM – Federal Investigative Services Department (FISD), provided the attendees with OPM statistics
and addressed the PSI industry’s concerns.   

        Ms. Dillaman provided statistics on the progress being made on the background investigations
conducted by OPM-FISD.  Ms. Dillaman stated that OPM does not make policy and only adheres to the
regulations and mandates such at the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.  

        Ms. Dillaman stated that the Daycare Providers’ background investigations are just as important
as the person seeking a top secret security clearance.  There is no difference in a Personnel Security
Investigation and a Background Investigation.  She stated, “An investigation is an investigation.”

NOTE:  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act – Title III, Sec. 3001.(a)(6) – “The term
‘‘personnel security investigation’’ means any investigation required for the purpose of determining the
eligibility of any military, civilian, or government contractor personnel to access classified information.”

        Ms. Dillaman briefed that OPM-FISD Contract Investigators do have a security clearance.  She
stated, that DOD personnel using JPAS don’t know what they’re doing and lack training.  She explained
that the security clearances for OPM Contract Investigators may be found in OPM’s CVS [Clearance
Verification System].  Ms. Dillaman explained there is a “bridge” between the JPAS and the CVS.  JPAS
Users can go into the JPAS and cross the “bridge” to access the Contract Investigators security
clearance information.  Ms. Dillaman continued to explain that the OPM Contract Investigators security
clearance is adjudicated by OPM after the Department of Energy (DOE) provided authorization to OPM
to adjudicate all of their Contract Investigators’ investigations.  

NOTE:   OPM does not have adjudicative authority to grant, suspend, terminate or revoke an individual’
s security clearance.  OPM adjudicates an individual’s Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) for
“employment” or “contract” for OPM.  The PSI request is completed and granting authority to investigate
an individual for “the purpose of making a determination of suitability or eligibility for a security
clearance.” (See OPM Form – Authorization for Release of Information)      

        Ms. Dillaman briefed that the PIPS is secure and has been Certified and Adjudicated by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  

A few days later, Ms. Dillaman sent an e-mail stating that she misspoke when she tied the C&A to the
Agency.  She stated, The PIPS was originally built to the Agency’s C2 security standards.”  She went on
to advise that the PIPS is a fully accredited, secure system in compliance with OPM policy that requires
all sensitive and major systems to be certified and accredited.  There is a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) between the OPM and DSS that established the agreement between both parties
to maintain an interconnection between the OPM IT platform and the JPAS.”

NOTE:  “…in compliance with OPM policy.”   This is NOT the same as the DOD Information Technology
Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP) that implements policy, assigns
responsibility and prescribes procedures to all DOD Agencies, their contractors and agents or other
agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology), etc.   

        Ms. Dillaman advised that she would prosecute to the fullest extent, any Investigator who falsifies
a Report of Investigation.  When asked if “cutting and pasting” was considered “falsification” Ms.
Dillaman asked how many times a Source says the same thing about the Subject.  Most Conference
Attendees agreed this probably occurs about ninety percent of the time.  Ms. Dillaman stated that OPM
would look into the possibility of creating a Pony (such as the FBI (BICS) uses) or a Disclaimer (such as
NSA uses) for Investigators to be able to utilize in order to cut down on the amount of time spent on
writing the same verbiage repeatedly within a ROI.  


SUMMARY

In summary, after the AFICA National Conference has been discussed with the attendees, and the
issues and concerns reviewed, it is deemed that the AFCIA White Paper dated 01/06/2006 stands a
written.  



FROM THE AFCIA PRESIDENT

Those AFCIA Members and OPM Contractors who were in attendance at the AFCIA National
Conference feel strongly that we have made tremendous progress at the AFCIA National Conference of
2006.

Bonnie Lowe-Walsh, Russell Vail, and Tom Dutcher did a great job in assisting in registration and
hosting the Conference.  Thank you.

It is greatly appreciated that Ms. Kathy Dillaman, OPM-FISD Associate Director and Ms. Joyce Tincher-
Harris, OPM-FISD Program Manager Workforce Program attended the AFCIA National Conference and
addressed numerous issues and concerns brought up by the Conference attendees.  We look forward
to continuing communicating with the OPM-FISD.

I cannot express how important it is for everyone in the Personnel Security Industry to work together as
a team in our efforts to achieve our joint goals to support national security and to provide all American
citizens and taxpayers with the National and Homeland Security they are entitled to.  

The AFCIA will continue its efforts to make our organization and its resources readily available to OPM-
FISD and work in a forward direction in keeping one common goal in mind, which remains, to serve and
further the national security of our great nation.

On behalf of the AFCIA and Board of Directors, I extend thanks and appreciation to all the OPM
Vendors, AFCIA Membership and to our distinguished speakers and Conference Attendees.  

Sincerely,
Carolyn Martin
President, AFCIA